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Accounting for tacit coordination* 
The passing of accounts and the broader case for accounting theory  
Abstract: Tacit coordination is a pervasive aspect of accounting practice. This paper teases out insights on tacit 
coordination from existing scholarship, starting with studies of everyday life accounting, then turning to 
professional practice. It develops an understanding that, in the application of rules and accounting standards, in 
producing, framing, auditing and using statements, records, apologies or excuses, accounting practitioners 
tacitly coordinate towards the passing of accounts. This passing can be articulated in terms of structures, 
agencies and processes of tacit coordination involved in making accounting happen. The implications of this 
understanding of accounting practice and the importance of the wider domain of enquiry it is indicating are 
discussed with respect to the stewardship position of accounting professionals and the further development of 
accounting theory. The passing of accounts charges accounting practitioners with the stewardship of silence and 
indicates a broader case for accounting theory to address the full continuum of accounting practices. One vital 
role of such theory is to offer antidotes against the idea that any account, any slice of information, or any amount 
of ‘big data’, could speak for itself – or that it should. 
Keywords: Accounting Theory; Tacit Coordination; Micro-sociology; Auditing; Framing; Stewardship.
“And in the end, a time will come when we shall all understand one another so well, so 
perfectly, that we shall have nothing further to say to one another.” 
Witold Kula (1986: 288), “Measures and Men” 
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There are silences in accounting that transcend the “silences in annual reports” (Chwastiak & J. Young 
2003), the “silence of the auditors” (Sikka 2009), and the silences in accounting research (Gallhofer 
1998; Kim 2004). Some of these silences result from strategic omissions or deliberate disengagements 
(Chen, Matsumoto, & Rajgopal 2011; Billings & Cedergren 2015). But, generally, these are silences full 
of activities as practitioners and stakeholders prepare, consider, and present their accounts, whilst 
others silently write up accounting research (Davie 2008: 1056-1058), and still others read it. These 
silent activities are eminently social as people relate to each other’s accounts, put accounts into 
context, make sense of them, and anticipate each other’s sense-making. The visible and explicit, 
verbally and numerically discrete products of accounting in financial statements, in standards, 
guidelines, textbooks, invoices and research papers, thus move within deep currents of silent social 
activities, perceptions and understandings. These currents are silent in the sense of being unverbalised 
and implicit, to some extent obscure and reserved – but they do not generally dampen the production 
of accounts. Indeed, is it not here, in the space of the implicit and reserved, that an account – the 
explicit and disclosed – begins to become possible? Do these silences not create the space in which 
an account will be heard (or hushed)? Do these currents of tacit understandings and anticipations not 
create the tide that will carry an account to those who will receive (or reject) it? Is it not here – such 
as in this space between you and me – that we begin to work out the destiny of an account? How then 
should we account for this space if it is otherwise, perhaps for good reasons, left unaccounted for? 
These questions are the starting point of the broader case for accounting theory which the present 
paper will develop. 
There is a well-known and long established literature on accounting theory (e.g., Paton 1922;  
American Accounting Association 1966) that discusses the purposes and practices of accounting, and 
most particularly, financial reporting. For all its apparent diversity (Hendricksen 1977; Watts & J.L. 
Zimmerman 1986; J. Christensen & Demski 2002; W. Scott 2014), they seem to share a fundamental 
focus on accounting as an economic and informational technology. When accounting theory has 
sought to connect to developments in information systems, it has often adopted an empiricist focus 
and an unquestioned concept of data (Sorter 1969; Lieberman & Whinston 1975; McCarthy 1982). 
There have been attempts to push the envelope of accounting theory towards a broader consideration 
of accounting in its social contexts, both in relation to financial accounting (Deegan & Unerman 2011) 
and to management accounting (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage 2007). In addition, various traditions 
of accounting theory have continued to exist alongside the international discourse (Zan 2007; Busse 
von Colbe 1996). However, a considerable gulf continues to be felt between academic efforts at 
formulating accounting theory and the diverse worlds of accounting practice (Lee 2013: 152-156). This 
paper presents a case for expanding efforts in accounting theory by reaching out to a broader 
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understanding of how accounting happens in a wide variety of instances and forms. It points to a 
continuum of practices involved in the giving and receiving of accounts in professional practice as 
much as in everyday life, associated with a range of coordination problems faced by high-brow as 
much as by low-brow accounting practitioners. The paper explores this continuum, among references 
to examples from the literature, through the example of the timesheet, a fairly primitive form of 
accounting information system that helps to articulate continuities across organised and spontaneous, 
professional and everyday life accounting. In this manner, the paper self-consciously turns to rather 
mundane and non-specialist examples to raise tacit coordination as a foundational issue for 
accounting as a whole – not least in the belief that such wider foundational issues are often swept 
aside by functional differentiations of accounting into more specialised, financial or managerial forms.  
There is a good deal of knowledge and a critical mass of scholarship on which this broader case for 
accounting theory can build. Some level of engagement with the silent undercurrents to how 
accounting takes place is unavoidable for every accounting practitioner – whether we are being asked 
how our day was or prodded to enter numbers into spreadsheets. We have our routines for coming 
up with responses that discharge us of our duties to account. These routines also discharge us from 
engaging with our ability to do so any further. Much like our management of everyday 
accountabilities, professional accounting practice mobilises skills on which we draw routinely and, 
usually, without much deliberation. We can verbalise on demand usually quite a few aspects of our 
routines, but many remain subject to more tacit forms of knowing (Polanyi 1983: 4-21). There is a 
critical mass of scholarship that has adopted an understanding of accounting as embodied, material 
and situated, reflexive, partly articulate, partly silent practice (e.g., Ahrens & Chapman 2007; A.R. 
Bryer 2011). But, whilst this research has challenged narrower understandings of accounting and 
highlighted the limits of much textbook accounting theory with respect to accounting’s wider 
undercurrents, it has failed to make a consistent counteroffer. Putting practice into words is a good 
starting point towards breaking the “silence of the social” (Hirschauer 2006) that pervades accounting. 
Yet, with respect to the possibility of developing broader variants of accounting theory that would be 
attentive to the full scope of everyday and professional accounting practice and present a 
comprehensive “domain theory” (Lukka & Vinnari 2014) of accounting, this silence has in many ways 
prevailed. 
Accounting scholars have noticed the pervasive co-existence of tacit and explicit forms of accounting 
knowledge (e.g., Morris & Empson 1998: 614-616; Rosman, Biggs, & R. Hoskin 2012). The continuing 
investigation of accounting as social and institutional practice (Hopwood & P. Miller 1994; Walker 
2016) has also made apparent the extent to which accounting, as personal and embodied practice, is 
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a social accomplishment. It has become evident that accounting is shaped within “communities of 
practice” (Lave & Wenger 1991) among practitioners and stakeholders who have learned what to 
account for and how to account for it (e.g., Dechow & Mouritsen 2005: 696-698; Kilfoyle, Richardson, 
& MacDonald 2013). The tacit dimension of such shaping has nevertheless not quite attracted the 
same attention in accounting research as in other social sciences. Most notable in this respect is 
perhaps the very limited impact on accounting research by micro-sociological studies and 
ethnomethodological studies of informal everyday life accounting (Goffman 1963a; Garfinkel 1967). 
These studies offer substantial insights for the present paper, despite offering no ready-made 
everyday-life accounting theory, no “method theory” (Lukka & Vinnari 2014) that would just wait to 
be applied to professional practice. 
Indeed, the clandestine appearance of the broad variety of practices that will be articulated here 
under the rubric of tacit coordination seems to be reproduced to some degree in the investigation of 
these practices by social scientists – even where such investigations have been pursued more 
programmatically. Tacitly coordinated practices have been widely investigated by scholars across the 
social sciences from micro-sociology (e.g., Goffman 1963a: 156-164; Katz 1999: 142-173) to game 
theory (e.g., Schelling 1960; Sugden 2004: 36-57), philosophy (Lewis 1969; Tummolini, Andrighetto, 
Castelfranchi, & Conte 2013), research in social history (e.g., Ermakoff 2008; Ashworth 1968: 420-421) 
and social cognition (see Kaufmann 2011:  172-174), but these efforts have not been converging on a 
unified or comprehensive understanding of tacit coordination. It might seem fitting that theory-
building in relation to tacit coordination has remained, at best, an implicit project across these efforts: 
game theory has lead the most explicitly analytical charge very much under its own steam; ‘rational-
choice theorists’ and their opponents have agreed to disagree on their assumptions about human 
action, despite converging on substantial observations when looking at tacit coordination (Vollmer 
2013a); empirical research has been content with using a range of concepts such as mind-reading, 
sympathy, tact, or entrainment, without establishing a common analytical vocabulary. 
The term ‘tacit coordination’ will be used here to refer to the full range of interdependent activities 
that happen without explicit instruction, solicitation or negotiation but produce distinct outcomes in 
in a regular manner – such as financial statements, reports, excuses, timesheets, invoices, or 
apologies. These outcomes permit characterising the underlying activities as tacitly coordinated to the 
extent that they make these outcomes possible. Just as in Thomas Schelling’s famous example of tacit 
coordination – two strangers coordinating to meet in New York City without information about the 
exact place or hour (Schelling 1960: 56) – it is neither the activities (such as asking people for 
directions, or the time) nor, consequently, the participants that would be silent: it is the process of 
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coordination itself that remains implicit and unverbalised, and thus, effectively, a tacit undercurrent 
to the outcomes that are being accomplished. 
There is no shame in drawing existing scholarship together based on such a loose delineation of a 
domain rather than on a more robust conceptual definition of the phenomenon of interest (Martin 
2015: 59-60). The paper will proceed inductively by teasing out and grouping together insights from 
prior studies, starting with initial insights on tacit coordination in everyday life accounting. These 
insights will be carried forward towards considerations of tacit coordination in professional practice 
and towards ways of articulating the phenomenon more systematically in relation to the structures, 
actors, and processes involved. Finally, the promise of developing this perspective further will be 
explored in relation to understanding the position of accounting practitioners in the increasingly 
complex assemblages they inhabit and, in conclusion, in relation to the further prospects of accounting 
theory. 
This broader case for accounting theory is animated by the preliminary investigation of what will 
successively become evident as tacit coordination towards the passing of accounts. This passing is a 
running-by of accounts, such as when accounting practitioners run by their partners or line managers 
the events of an afternoon, or when they run financial statements by senior management, banks, or 
investors. The notion of passing thus indicates an analogy to the passing of people in everyday 
interaction described by Goffman (1963b: 73-91) and Garfinkel (1967: 137-145). However, when 
accounts run into people and artefacts, this results to some extent also in a passing through, a running-
into in the literal sense: accounts run into and pass through hands, keyboards, networks, screens, 
books and papers; accounts of chargeable hours pass through timesheets, categories and spreadsheet 
cells; and this account passes through you, the reader. ‘Passing’ indicates a simultaneous letting go 
and rubbing off of accounts, and both aspects are associated with some degree of finality: the passing 
of accounts is also a passing of opportunities to account for something more, or something different. 
To engage with this process of passing requires accounting theory to reach out to areas of accounting 
knowledge that may seem somewhat messy and untidy. We will see that accounting practitioners, if 
they ignore these areas in favour of leaner forms of knowledge, are increasingly likely to find their 
positions undermined. Perhaps it is timely for accounting scholars and practitioners alike to confess 
that we cannot confine what is real and relevant to what we are able to clean up – such as when we 
try to stop ourselves from speaking metaphorically.  
Everyday life accountants tacitly coordinate toward the passing of accounts as family members, 
partners, friends, or strangers; accounting professionals tacitly coordinate towards passing as 
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members of firms and professional associations, colleagues, business partners, clients, or regulators. 
What sets the professional apart from the everyday life accountant are the distinct sets of companions 
involved in the passing of accounts, and the distinct complications and detours which they impose on 
making passing happen. There is certainly a lot of explicit guidance, carefully verbalised in textbooks, 
rules and standards, available to professional accountants who coordinate towards the passing of 
accounts. Despite such assistance, however, the efforts of the accounting professional share 
characteristics with those of the everyday life accountant that indicate pervasive patterns of 
coordination which transcend low-brow and high-brow forms of accounting and are as powerful as 
they are tacit. I will start the exploration of tacit coordination in the low-brow forms of everyday life 
accounting. Their common experience offers a unique point of shared access to these pervasive 
patterns of coordination.  
Tacit coordination in everyday life accounting 
Accounting scholars have at times referred to the near-canonical paper by Scott and Lyman (1968) in 
arguing that accounting as a social practice is much more general and widespread than the jurisdiction 
of the accounting profession would suggest (e.g., Aerts 1994: 340; Messner 2009: 920). Scott and 
Lyman, however, started their paper with the observation that the giving of accounts in everyday life 
is confined to special occasions: “An account is not called for when people engage in routine, common-
sense behaviour in a cultural environment that recognizes that behaviour as such” (M. Scott & Lyman 
1968: 46-47). For Scott and Lyman (1968: 47), accounts were “linguistic forms that are offered for 
untoward action”. Their paper distinguishes between excuses, which appeal to accidental or 
unavoidable circumstances and might involve scapegoating (pp. 47-50), and justifications, variants of 
what Sykes and Matzka (1957), in a famous paper on delinquency, had called “techniques of 
neutralization”. The interest of Scott and Lyman ultimately was in the analysis of everyday 
conversation (ibid.: 61-62), which makes their careful delineation of the function of accounts, 
associated with deviance, mishap and mischief, perhaps even more remarkable: Accounts are given 
when things have gone wrong and people cannot avoid talking about this, which otherwise they would 
much prefer. 
Despite certain ritual exchanges of accounts in everyday life (“I am doing very well, thank you.”), the 
experience of being asked to account for ourselves occurs mostly in situations that are more 
confrontational than usual. In everyday life, we tend to avoid such confrontations as much as we can 
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and to the extent of not seeming too interested in what others are doing. Behaviour in public places 
tends to be governed by a norm of civil inattention (Goffman 1963a: 84-88, 156-158). Orienting to this 
norm keeps involvement in social situations limited, mostly to those who already have an ongoing 
concern with each other; encroachment into an ongoing encounter is considered intrusive, if not rude, 
if it has not been explicitly encouraged; drawing outsiders deliberately into an encounter is considered 
a “scene” (Goffman 1963a: 185-187). In discouraging encroachment, we tend to let each other know 
by way of demonstration that we are already ‘occupied’, such as by reading a book or wearing 
headphones; an explicit statement to that effect would be understood as a sign of already having been 
disturbed. People in public places thus tend to coordinate toward non-involvement and “tacit 
cooperation in maintaining conventional closure” (Goffman 1963a: 159). Such cooperation minimises 
the odds of ‘being approached’ and having to account for oneself more explicitly (Goffman 1963a: 
156-65). If the presentation of self in the age of social media seems to be associated with increased 
activities toward publicising accounts of ourselves (e.g., Murthy 2012: 1062-1063), such accounting 
remains highly selective and controlled (e.g., Hodkinson 2017). It does not challenge the legitimacy of 
practising more defensive, non-verbal, if not completely silent, forms of accounting for ourselves, 
nowadays marked in public spaces, perhaps somewhat ironically, by eyeing our smartphones. 
Erving Goffman attempted to consolidate his investigations of everyday life encounters within an 
analysis of what he then called the “interaction order” (Goffman 1983). For Goffman (1983: 4) “the 
cognitive relation we have with those present before us, without which relationship our activity, 
behavioural and verbal, could not be meaningfully organized” was central to such order. He 
understood this meaningful organisation to be based on participants’ “effective cooperation in 
maintaining expectations” (p. 5). Such cooperation implies playing along with whatever is going on. 
Among participants of everyday interaction there appears to be a “tacit pledge of some sort” (Rawls 
1987: 141) not to upset each other’s expectations. Randall Collins (2004: 144-145) has called this the 
“’Simon and Garfinkel’ principle” – a commitment to finding ways of being okay with just about 
everything that is transpiring. Commitment to this principle will tend to keep intact the tacit pledge 
on “the definition of the situation” (Goffman 1959: 24-25; Rawls 1987: 142-145) – whatever that 
definition may be. Rather than deliberating to define a situation explicitly, participants of everyday 
interaction privately adjust their expectations to a level of activity considered by default to be normal 
and regular. Keeping this attitude in place can involve a great deal of internal activity in bringing 
individual expectations and experiences in line with the “tacit pledge” – to the extent that even the 
hijacking of a plane would be normalised (Sacks 1984b: 419). 
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The Simon of “Simon and Garfinkel” is Herbert A., and he is referred to by Collins for the limited 
“satisficing” rationality of this principle of affirmation (see Vollmer 2013a: 382-385). Harold Garfinkel, 
however, is the lead singer in that duo for Collins, who credits him with the insight that “the most 
important ‘ethnomethods’ are to avoid raising questions” (R. Collins 2004: 144). Munro (2001: 474) 
duly notices that Garfinkel’s understanding of giving accounts is somewhat broader than Scott and 
Lyman’s (1968): Garfinkel (1967: 9-24) emphasises that many activities in everyday life appear 
organised such as to account for themselves without demanding a more explicit or verbal account. 
The various activities of people in public places who demonstrate that they are “occupied” are good 
examples of this, and rarely is there a need to tell people that you are engaged with your book, or 
phone. At the same time, the distinction between making things explicit and leaving them implicit is 
critically important for Garfinkel’s understanding of social practice and its “ethnomethods”. Garfinkel 
devotes an entire chapter to investigating the keeping of accounts in this more specific sense, by 
tracing the “good organizational reasons for ‘bad’ clinical records” (Garfinkel 1967: 186-207). 
That book’s second chapter about the “routine grounds of everyday activities” has been its most 
widely read and contains descriptions of Garfinkel’s famous breaching experiments. With respect to 
the management of everyday life accounting these experiments illustrate the “Simon and Garfinkel” 
principle of affirmation and minimal interference with the keeping of what Garfinkel (1967: 36-41) 
calls “background expectancies”. The frustration of background expectancies triggers, in Garfinkel’s 
breaching experiments, escalating forms of accounting and accountability that are unpleasant and 
confrontational: “What’s the matter with you? You know what I mean.” (Garfinkel 1967: 43); “Why 
are you asking me such silly questions? Surely I don’t have to explain such a statement. Why should I 
have to stop to analyze such a statement? Everybody understands my statements and you should be 
no exception. (…) What came over you? We never talk this way, do we?” (p. 44). The experience of 
breaching rattles the sense of normality among subject and leads them to question their relationship 
to the experimenters (who were often their children or partners; Garfinkel 1967: 52-54). Against this 
background any need to account for what one is doing seems to indicate that accountability has been 
badly managed on the tacit level on which we would ideally just like – and as friends and family would 
expect – to pass (Garfinkel 1967: 137-145; Goffman 1963b: 73-91).1 The outbursts in Garfinkel’s 
experiments show their frustration about not having their accounts passed – note the references to 
 
1 Perhaps it is in relation to such presentations of self that the impact of social media on everyday life accounting 
and accountability has been most pronounced (e.g., Stern 2015). Leaving presentations of ourselves online, to 
be passed by others whenever they happen to run by them, dramatically extends the process of passing over 
time and space. 
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“my statements” in the quote above. They express a general expectation of cooperation in the passing 
of accounts, an expectation for others to not be ‘difficult’ (Keane 2016: 93-96). 
One of Garfinkel’s more particular insights in this respect is that the giving of accounts is governed by 
an “et cetera clause” (Garfinkel 1967: 73-74). Several of Garfinkel’s experiments are about defying this 
clause by persistently asking for clarification (Garfinkel 1967: 42-44). This procedure demonstrates 
how making things explicit is subject to narrow limits – and how easy it is to become ‘difficult’ in this 
respect. Again, Garfinkel’s findings show that we tend to regard these limits as entirely reasonable 
and that we are ready to defend them, often quite furiously, against the imposition of ‘difficulties’: 
“[P]eople know what not to question; they know when collectively to invoke an ‘et cetera clause,’ and 
when to say, ‘Oh, let it pass.’” (Weick 1974: 492) Respective dispositions seem like a good basis for 
“effective coordination in maintaining expectations” (Goffman 1983: 5), and Thomas Schelling has 
famously pointed out that human beings tend to do surprisingly well in coordinating in this manner 
(Schelling 1960: 57). In sum, if “[a]ny setting organizes its activities to make its properties as an 
organized environment of practical activities detectable, countable, recordable, reportable, tell-a-
story-aboutable, analysable – in short, accountable” (Garfinkel 1967: 33; italics in the original), such 
organising seems to empower us to pass each other’s accounts with as little complication as possible.  
These considerations appear to set the organisation of everyday life accounting somewhat apart from 
what people experience during their working hours. In workplace settings, the passing of accounts 
often seems to require a more involved effort in the production and passing of records, notices, and 
reports. Getting people to engage in such accounting does not generally seem to involve a breaching 
of background expectancies among co-workers. As organisation members we seem to be more 
tolerant of intrusive accountabilities (Roberts 1991) – not least because these accountabilities are 
associated with securing and keeping membership roles that we consider attractive (Barnard 1968: 
168-169; Van Maanen 1975). The latter will certainly also be true for our desire to maintain less formal, 
more intimate relationships and account for ourselves accordingly. But if your loved one asks you to 
fill out a timesheet, it will feel quite unlike when your line manager does so; you would probably want 
to discuss your (and their) expectations as a result. 
In other words, passing accounts in professional and organisational practice is associated with “mores 
that are distinct from the mores of society” (Simon 1952: 1135), and certainly with “mores” in support 
of more intrusive and explicit forms of accounting and accountability (Mason, Button, Lankshear, 
Coates, & Sharrock 2002). Any such difference though is gradual, and many hybrid forms of accounting 
exist in formal organisations, compounding management expectations with common-sensical notions 
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of accountability (Clancy & F. Collins 1979; Kilfoyle, Richardson, & MacDonald 2013). When keeping 
account of hours on a timesheet, for example, you will use a predetermined set of categories of 
activity, perhaps with some further clarification on how to populate the boxes associated with days 
and hours. Whilst the categories spell out expectations about what is to be put into these boxes, you 
will also need to draw on your understanding of how many hours on a given day can credibly be 
subsumed under, say, ‘research’ or ‘scoping of business opportunities’, particularly if the Friday 
afternoon boxes have to be filled. Formal organisation does not generally eliminate other, more 
implicit and less verbal forms of coordination (Bonaccio, O’Reilly, O’Sullivan, & Chiocchio 2016), and 
the rich social fabric of our workplaces supports considerable continuity across everyday life and 
professional accounting practice (Button & Sharrock 1998; Rawls 2008). Accordingly, our accounts 
(such as of that Friday afternoon when you took your colleagues out for a drink) differ greatly in style 
and form – but are met with consent or suspicion for not entirely dissimilar reasons by our line 
managers at work and our partners at home (Anderson & Sharrock 2017: 71-72). 
Tacit coordination in accounting as organisational and professional 
practice  
Accounting scholars have identified numerous aspects of tacit coordination in organisational and 
professional practice. The following review presents a purposive sample rather than a systematic 
assessment of some of these findings. This brief review will aim to bring out continuities across 
professional and everyday life accounting with respect to the patterns of tacit coordination discussed 
above and then gradually build on them towards articulating the more involved forms of coordination 
associated with professional practice in organised social settings. Simultaneously, it will proceed, as it 
were, outwards, from considering the role of tacit coordination in the preparation of accounts towards 
considering coordination in the further passing of accounts within increasingly complex “accounting 
assemblages” (P. Miller & O’Leary 1996). This will gradually extend the scope of the discussion across 
the wider domains of accounting in its diverse manifestations, which will facilitate the broader case 
for accounting theory this paper is trying to support. While many of the examples below are initially 
drawn from financial accounting, which by virtue of its more explicitly codified and standardised 
character presents a more immediate target of engagement for the present perspective, the 
discussion in this section will eventually touch base with management accounting by returning to the 
continuities between the passing of accounts and the passing of people indicated by Goffman and 
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Garfinkel in everyday life accounting.2 The more theoretically-minded analysis that follows in 
subsequent sections will proceed on the basis of the wider continuities of accounting practice that 
emerge from closing this circle.  
Rules, standards, and the “feel for the game” 
Garfinkel’s “et cetera clause” seems to turn the practical impossibility of accounting for ourselves and 
our actions in full detail into a general rule of everyday life accounting. This practical impossibility, 
however, would also apply to the detailed explication of any such rule of accounting. No rule can by 
itself account for the horizon of its applications (Wittgenstein 1967; D.H. Zimmerman 1970: 230-237). 
David Bloor (1997: 9-26) has aptly called such incompleteness “meaning finitism”.3 Whether we talk 
about everyday life accounting, about bookkeeping, costing, or about mathematics (Wittgenstein 
1967), we can neither explicate fully the practice itself nor the rule allegedly governing it. Whilst 
Garfinkel’s “et cetera clause” acknowledges these limitations for everyday life accounting, in 
professional accounting practice, these limitations become perhaps most apparent in the appeal to 
human judgement in financial accounting. 
McSweeney (1997) examined the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s conceptual framework 
publications of the early 1980’s to find that “[t]here is no escape from what FASB (…) itself calls ‘human 
judgement’” (McSweeney 1997: 698). Similarly, Hines (1991: 327) has observed that “since the only 
context in which concepts are meaningful is in the context of their use, the FASB, inevitably, resorts 
to drawing on accounting practice”. Hines’ analysis of the FASB’s Conceptual Framework identifies 
several implicit assumptions that inform the practice of setting accounting standards. When she talks 
about “the objectivity function” of representation as “the central premise of our society” (1991: 327), 
this is in line with McSweeney’s (1997: 706) observation that “producers of accounting 
representations do not start each time anew nor in isolation: the objects they represent and the 
representational procedures they employ are always, to some extent, pre-classified and predesigned. 
There is a disciplinary historicity, or narrative accrual, of accounting practice” (italics are mine). This 
narrative accrual is incorporated into current accounting practices and rules – and into standards that 
 
2 See below, “Technologies of the soul”. 
3 See Leung (2011: 7-20) for a more extended contextualisation of this school of thought within a discussion of 
financial accounting. On a more general level, there has been an extended discussion between sociologists such 
Bloor and ethnomethodologists such as Lynch (1992) or Sharrock & Button (1999) about the constraints this 
incompleteness of rules and meaning, if not of linguistic expressions altogether, places on theorising social order.  
Regardless of the outcome of these disputes, the status of rules as concepts of theoretical discourse – rather 
than as precarious and unstable artefacts of empirical practice – has suffered, possibly beyond repair (see also 
Vollmer 2013: 16-18).  
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need to appeal to human judgement to be successfully applied, all of which relies on practitioners, 
regulators and stakeholders’ ability to fill in the gaps. 
In their widely cited papers, Hines (1991) and McSweeney (1997) seem to disagree on whether the 
tacit agreement on the ideal of representational faithfulness should be maintained or abandoned. At 
the same time, both would seem to accept the loose fit between accounting standards and the actual 
practice of accounting. Practitioners will always to some extent be left to their own devices when 
making sense of accounting constructs and their relationship to reality. In a somewhat similar spirit, 
Mouck (2004: 537-540) discusses the construction of net income by the FASB as a “fuzzy indicator” of 
a reality that remains “subjective”. The ability of accounting standards to provide guidance in this 
respect is not in any sense “in” the standards themselves. It is rather the collective accomplishment 
of a community of practitioners and stakeholders who draw on a variety of skills – some based on the 
exercise of common sense, others acquired in years of professional training and experience – to bring 
about and maintain conformity and regularity, and any kind of sense, in accounting practice. 
To summarise, the inevitable gap between accounting as the craft of making events and activities 
explicit in statements and artefacts and the representation of such practice in accounting standards 
and textbooks needs to be overcome by practitioners. Aligning accounting with rules and standards 
or making up standards and textbooks in accordance with practice requires what Bourdieu (1990: 66-
67) has called “practical sense” – the sense through which practitioners ‘get’ what accounts, 
accounting concepts, or accounting standard are about. The compliance of accounting with codified 
rules thus demonstrates how the very substance and coherence of accounting does not follow from 
rules, standards, guidelines, and the like, but is, once again, a result of “effective cooperation in 
maintaining expectations” (Goffman 1983: 5) among participants who learn, practice, unlearn and re-
learn accounting as a practice embodied in flesh and blood (Anderson & Sharrock 2017: 47; Anderson-
Gough, Grey, & Robson 1998). Not only are many instances of such learning tacit, silent and private: 
the overall process in which accounting takes shape is per se a result of tacit coordination among 
practitioners who develop and continuously update a grasp of accounts and accountabilities – a “feel 
for the game” (Bourdieu 1990: 66-67). 
In much the same way as we cooperate in everyday life in accepting the gaps in each other’s accounts, 
accounting professionals cooperate in managing the “unbearable ambiguity of accounting” 
(McSweeney 1997). This ambiguity is not the result of a technical deficit that everyday life and 
professional accountants would struggle to overcome due to a lack of training, guidance, or wisdom. 
It is an ambiguity that results from gaps no account can ever overcome on terms that could be built 
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into the account itself: the gap in the relationship between the account and what it stands for, and 
the gap between this relationship and the rules that claim to govern it. These gaps are as wide as those 
between a cell on a timesheet, the events of a Friday afternoon, and the instructions at the bottom of 
the sheet. These are gaps that can only be crossed by accounting practitioners, producers and 
recipients of accounts alike, who are able and willing to relate incomplete accounts, irretrievable 
realities, and finite rulebooks, and trust each other’s abilities and willingness to do so (Anderson & 
Sharrock 2017: 124-126). To evoke the spirit of accounting standards in the preparation of financial 
statements is not unlike appealing to common sense in completing and reading timesheets, or 
expecting a ‘straight’ answer from your partner about say, ‘what happened ont Friday afternoon.’  
Framing for consumption 
The construction by standard-setters of users “more as hypothetical readers of financial statements 
than as actual readers” (J. Young 2006: 596) confidently papers over these blanks and the truces 
among those who have learnt to fill them. The construction of users of financial statements as 
economic decision-makers frames the use of accounts as a problem of investment (J. Young 2006: 
596-597). Besides “decision usefulness” and agency theory, there are certainly many more (political, 
legal, religious, ethical, ecological) ways of framing the use of accounting information. The 
uncomfortable problem of ‘the’ user of accounting information though is that no discourse, however 
hegemonic it may appear, can fully anticipate such framing, and this complicates the passing of 
accounts. 
The problem of coordination across settings can be analysed as a problem of anticipating and 
influencing the framing of accounts among different sets of practitioners who will handle them 
(Graham 2008; Lorino, Mourey, & Schmidt 2017). There is never a single frame of consumption for 
producers of accounts to anticipate before passing them on, and much, if not most, of the framing 
mobilised by users of accounting information will tend to remain implicit. Framing is a production of 
context (Goffman 1974; Scheff 2005), and this production may drift gradually or shift on cue (Lorino, 
Mourey, & Schmidt 2017). Jordan and Messner (2012) investigate a case in which the framing of 
performance indicators changed over time from being appreciated as “enabling” towards being 
perceived as “coercive.” Ezzamel, Robson, and Stapleton (2012) show how budgets are framed 
according to different, and gradually changing “institutional logics” across educational agencies and 
schools. As consumption is “structured by institutional mechanisms, regulations, and the role of 
expertise” (Graham 2008: 778) just as much as by the individual trajectories of participants through 
social space, accounts travel across situations and user groups, sometimes in the presence of 
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producers, though often in their absence. Much framing will remain gracefully tacit as consumers 
follow the “Simon and Garfinkel” principle and let accounts pass (see also de Certeau 1984: 30-32). 
Heftier changes in framing like the ones reported by Jordan and Messner (2012) or the more step-
function like frame-shiftings observed by Lorino, Mourey, and Schmidt (2017) tend to be associated 
with some degree of unease in ongoing productions of context. Such productions often seem to be 
stable just to the extent that people do not ask questions about them (as in Garfinkel’s breaching 
experiments). 
Still, some elements of presenting accounting information appear in stable patterns across contexts. 
The notion of accountability as a “root metaphor” of professional practice is a good example: “Root 
metaphors are particularly significant to any discipline, because such metaphors delimit the implicit 
assumptions of what is real, what is significant, how things relate, what can be known, and how it can 
be known. The root metaphor thus informs and reflects both the implicit epistemology and 
metaphysics of a discipline.” (Ravenscroft & Williams 2009: 772) Whilst the tacit understanding of 
accountability and its different modes and possibilities can to some extent be made explicit, this 
requires a special academic effort (Roberts 1991; Bovens 2007). The pervasive use of grids in 
accounting is another example: “We may (…) practice accounting in this form because the form is seen 
to represent a certain transcendental ideal, with emphasis on straight lines. It is likewise possible that 
we practice accounting within the framework of gridded straight lines simply because we are able to 
physically observe these lines more effectively than, e.g., oblique lines. Here the grid also represents 
the value of simplicity, a quality important for pedagogical purposes.” (Chakhovich & McGoun 2016: 
50; italics are mine) We feel that it is a good idea to present accounting information in this manner – 
so much so that we also feel that it does not need spelling out, but not to the extent of avoiding 
disclaimers. 
If the use of such devices remains to be fully appreciated in accounting theory, their intuitive appeal 
would seem to result from lifetimes of exposure to collective habits of presenting and passing 
accounts (Ezzamel 2012: 119-124). The use of common styles in using these devices tends to be 
associated with rhetorical aspects of framing accounting information (Aho 1985; Quattrone 2009). 
That such aspects are often treated as ‘merely’ rhetorical is further indication of a preference to keep 
them tacit. In this way, tacitly coordinating towards framing accounting information in a production 
of context is presented as exogenous to that information and thus as something which an account is 
‘not really’ about. This impulse to present accounts as clean from contextual contamination is 
common across contexts but, as will be discussed below, it can undermine the position of accounting 
professionals in the long term.  
15 
 
Thomas Schelling (1960: 57) found that in tacit coordination participants will often converge on “some 
clue for coordinating behaviour, some focal point for each person’s expectation of what the other 
expects him to expect to be expected to do”, “finding the key, or rather finding a key – any key that is 
mutually recognized” (Schelling 1960: 57). A couple of years later Goffman (1974: 43-45) chose the 
same word in examining the role of cues in transforming the framing of activities. The point both 
Schelling and Goffman were making is that there are certain cues that set the tone of, as much as they 
may open the door to, distinct levels of coordination, whether participants are coordinating at a 
distance (as in Schelling’s New York City example) or in face-to-face interaction (as in Goffman’s 
preferred example of transforming serious engagements into play). Accounting practitioners and 
stakeholders use a sizable register of signs as cues in ongoing productions of context: income, capital, 
profit, discount rates, standard costs, targets, etc. Scepticism about these signs in relation to their 
ability to represent reality does not generally discount their value as “coordination devices” (Clark 
1996: 64-65, 132-133).4 
The context and meaning of an account is thus pieced together from a variety of cues, some of which 
become part of the account whilst others remain external or ‘contextual’. In this sense, accounts can 
never be fully cleaned up. If they were, we would be at a loss about what to do with them; we would 
struggle to produce context; and, as a result, the accounts concerned would fail to speak to us in any 
way. What a timesheet will mean to you as a form-filler – an attempt by management to control your 
effort, a tedious exercise, an opportunity to make your point, or to conceal what you were really up 
to on that afternoon: you will have to infer any of this from what the timesheet is asking, when and 
how it was presented to you, where you see it circulating, or where you know it will never be seen. 
What your timesheet will mean for your line manager could be related to any of these considerations 
– and to how you present yourself otherwise. The elements of framing can be more sophisticated 
(drawn from standards, theories, and suchlike) or mundane (grids, graphs and icons, perceptions of 
care or sloppiness, a history of curious entries on Friday afternoons). We understand how to use and 
connect these elements when making sense of accounts and we coordinate in rendering accounts 
acceptable accordingly. In professional practice as in everyday life, we spell out bits and pieces of 
these collective efforts, just enough to frame and subject them to an “et cetera clause” that protects 
us from “silly questions”. 
 
4 For examples of how the coordinating role of accounting signs is addressed in the accounting literature see 
Hopwood (1976: 41-45) and Macintosh, Shearer, Thornton, & Welker (2000: 45-46). 
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Auditing 
Auditing is a special occasion that rallies producers and users of accounts into closer engagements. 
Audits are thus instructive cases for exploring coordination among sets of accounting practitioners in 
instances which would appear to provide opportunities for more immediate coordination and sense-
making in the passing of accounts. Audits are also instructive for exploring the differences between 
everyday life and professional accounting practice: They provide occasions for an activity which in 
everyday life seems mostly limited to cases of interpersonal emergencies – the solicited disassembling 
and re-assembling of accounts (as in “Let’s go through your Friday afternoon at work again, darling, 
shall we?”) in institutionalised occasions to be ‘difficult’ and ask questions that might otherwise be 
considered silly or threatening. 
Perhaps the first thing to notice about institutionalised audits in organised social settings is the vital 
role of audit papers that “reflexively construct the ‘reality’ of what happened during an audit” (Hines 
1991: 324; Power 2003: 386-387). The production of working papers indicates that auditing is to some 
degree a backstage activity that precedes the presentation of accounts to an audience of outsiders. 
This keeps some of the issues with framing accounting information discussed above very much alive 
in auditing. Simultaneously, for those involved in an audit, it is often a front-stage activity of presenting 
themselves to other insiders of the audit process (Power 1996: 311-312; see Goffman 1959: 32-39). 
As a heterogeneous assemblage of engaging with both papers and persons, of silent reading and oral 
examination, the audit appears to mimic the “learning practices of the academic world” (K. Hoskin & 
Macve 1994: 75). The audit sets in motion a process of coordinating people and accounts, mobilising 
practitioners and stakeholders into both silent and articulate engagements, drawing once again on 
both general rules and situated judgements (e.g., MacLullich 2003; Shankar & Tan 2006). The term 
“audit” conspicuously emphasises the role of those to whom accounts are being presented and thus 
of the party who is reading or listening rather than offering an account.  
Audit judgement research has tried to listen in on the silences that are part of this general setup (e.g., 
Trotman, Bauer, & Humphreys 2015; Payne & Ramsay 2008). This research is rich in detail and has yet 
to be fully appreciated for its implications with respect to the distributed character of letting accounts 
pass within the audit process. The comparatively few ethnographic studies of audit interaction 
emphasise the emotional aspects of situations that are initially riddled with tension and fear and give 
way to feelings of comfort only very gradually (Pentland 1993; Barrett, D. Cooper, & Jamal 2005; 
Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, & Paillé 2014). Considered from the position of everyday life accounting, this 
fearful atmosphere is exactly what we would have to expect in situations in which the general 
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cooperation in letting each other’s accounts pass – my accounts should be good enough for you, your 
accounts should be good enough for me – is withdrawn and replaced by a license for being sceptical 
and, we might say, difficult.  
As a result, an audit might seem like a series of nervous dress rehearsals for an eventual passing of 
accounts that cannot happen immediately, but that must happen eventually. Auditing has accordingly 
been described as an interaction ritual that overcomes uncertainty and apprehension through 
repetition (Pentland 1993: 605-612; Power 2003: 384-385). The audit process presents a pattern of 
“entrainment” (R. Collins 2004: 47-78) in which participants, through a common focus on a set of ritual 
objects (accounts, guidelines, standards, working papers) and a series of ritual engagements (offering 
reports, signing them, serialising them in versions, and so on), generate the solidarity that helps them 
overcome the initial embarrassment of presenting difficulties for one another. This solidarity is 
“stored” in symbols (R. Collins 2004: 79-87) such as in audit reports (see Skærbæk 2009: 984-985) and, 
eventually, in audited accounts. The very idea of the audit emphasises the tacit side of entrainment 
and mutual commitment by giving the lead role to those who are being presented with accounts 
rather than to those presenting them, and audit research tends to reproduce this asymmetry in its 
focus on auditors’ judgements and intuitions. 
An audit produces paper trails along with encounters among practitioners, but it is the 
accommodation of perceptions, judgement and feelings that fosters the level of solidarity needed to 
invest the audit with meaning and veracity (S. Mills & Bettner 1992: 190-196; Pentland 1993). As this 
process tends to be treated as a mere by-product of the ‘actual’ audit (wherever that would ‘really’ 
take place), its components are articulated only partially (e.g., in terms of feelings or judgements). 
Rather than substituting ‘mere’ judgement with rigour and objectivity, the focus on the repeated 
engagement with accounts up to the presentation of a final report marginalises the tacit character of 
verification. Similar to treating the presentation and framing of accounting information as ‘mere’ 
rhetoric, the social aspects of the audit are separated from its alleged clean and technical core and 
thus remain obscure characteristics of the audit process. Both examples indicate a differentiation in 
professional accounting practice that associates the social with the silent and dirty, and the technical 
with the explicit and clean (Morales & Lambert 2013).  
The enduring significance of auditing as an area of empirical intelligence about the passing of accounts 
derives from the fact that the audit institutionalises sequences of probing and signing off, of opening 
and closing the books, that otherwise remain undifferentiated in a series of next to unnoticeable 
passes: of accounts that pass unchallenged or even unnoticed, of accountants who pass papers, 
18 
 
reasons, e-mails, excuses, or back-up excuses by stakeholders who are often occupied otherwise. The 
audit is an institutionalised hold-up to the process of passing and it lends legitimacy to what would in 
most other circumstances be considered a deliberate act of sabotage. The audit creates a legitimate 
occasion for holding up the passing of accounts while raising the stakes for everybody involved. Signing 
off accounts during an audit is in principle not generally more complete, determinate or explicit than 
any other way of letting them pass (Did you consider every column of the timesheet that you have 
just signed off? The entire page? Did you ‘get’ what people were doing in this time? Did your signature 
really mean to sign all of this off?). But it transforms the passing of accounts into a much riskier 
exercise for everybody involved. Thus, the audit highlights, in its nervously held up and slowed down 
version of the passing of accounts, that the passing of accounts is quietly also, once again, a passing 
of people, of identities that are being claimed and, typically, affirmed in the process. 
Technologies of the soul 
In tracing the passes that are associated with giving an “account of oneself” (Butler 2005), accounting 
scholarship has considered at some length the impact of accounting on those whose existence is put 
on record. More particularly, a wealth of research in settings of professional practice has followed up 
on Michel Foucault’s intuition that the “soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy” 
(Foucault 1977: 30), an effect to which accounting contributes. Accounting has been associated with 
“technologies of the self” to the extent that it renders individuals “calculable” in both the passive and 
active voice (e.g., K. Hoskin & Macve 1986: 125-134; P. Miller & O’Leary 1994). In analogy to Foucault’s 
(1977: 195-227) classical reinterpretation of Bentham’s Panopticon and its lines of visibility, the 
dispersion of accounts and accountabilities are understood to mobilise people’s souls (e.g., Roberts 
1991: 358-360; Walker 2010). 
Among Foucault’s most fruitful observations about visibility as a “trap” was that the Panopticon 
sustains “a power relation independent of the person who exercises it” (Foucault 1977: 201). As the 
accommodation of the prisoner to being watched is rather one-sided it may seem far-fetched to 
consider it a form of tacit coordination: to any prisoner’s move there is no visible countermove at the 
centre, and the group of prisoners is turned into “a collection of separated individuals” (Foucault 1977: 
201), unable to coordinate as a group. However, such individualisation is an effect of the panoptic grid 
that materialises gradually among those who learn to live with it. As prisoners (and also pupils, 
students, workers, soldiers, managers etc.) accommodate to being observed, they produce an order 
of individuals. The panoptic arrangement generalises the tacitness of individualisation by inducing 
adjustments across cells that are private and quiet whilst keeping the activity at the centre somewhat 
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in the dark. Considered in relation to Schelling’s understanding of coordination problems (Schelling 
1960: 54-58), it indicates an asymmetric form of tacit coordination with one party staying put (as 
when, say, your future partner is “swiping” for a date in New York City on a dating app, or your next 
employer is looking at your university webpage) whilst others curate and offer their accounts (say, by 
working on their personal profile pages). 
The structural understanding of panopticism in terms of a centre-periphery network is what makes 
the Panopticon an appealing metaphor for investigating a wide variety of social arrangements 
(Foucault 1977: 227-228). With respect to panopticist forms of tacit coordination in networks of 
accountability, three general observations are worth making against the background of the rich 
literature that exists in accounting scholarship. Firstly, accounts will be offered from peripheral 
positions (e.g., by inmates, workers, people updating their LinkedIn profiles) based on beliefs about 
what is visible at central positions (for guards, managers, or recruiters); this may motivate a certain 
level of gamesmanship (Goffman 1961: 171-186). Secondly, these accounts will reflect the experience 
of accountability within the overall grid (e.g., of what it means to be a well-behaved prisoner, 
employee, or somebody with experience); this grants a significant role to discourse. Respective sense-
making has mostly been discussed with respect to “rationalities of government” (P. Miller & Rose 
1990: 5-7), which seems like a very dignified expression for the kind of guesswork involved across the 
grid. Rationalising discourse may sometimes give the impression of a centralised, and quite explicit, 
coordination of activities, perceptions and accounts (e.g., in relation to performance targets or the 
political issue of the day). On closer inspection of respective “accounting assemblages” (P. Miller & 
O’Leary 1996), what order we find in them is brought about and maintained in a decentralised manner 
(Quattrone & Hopper 2005: 760-761). Discourse certainly has a role in orchestrating activities and 
identities (e.g., Du Gay & Salaman 1992: 627-631), but even coordinating people by telling them 
explicitly what to do will only provide them with building blocks for their accounts, their intended and 
accomplished passes. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, these passes will literally go through us: 
Accounting practices are technologies of the soul because running accounts by others in the first 
instance runs them by ourselves, presenting us with the unsettling question of who that is who wants 
to pass. 
Explicit forms of producing and circulating accounts of ourselves from timesheets to performance 
reports, résumés, or CV’s reiterate relations of account-giving. We accommodate to these by building 
biographies that we present on demand and ponder in our quieter moments. Our accounts tend to be 
realised and passed in the ramshackle manner of portfolios and CV’s, measures, marks, rankings or 
ratings, all of which we become invested in by filling in the blanks of what these accounts might mean 
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to others, or to ourselves. The individualising effects across persons governing themselves in 
“numericized environments” (Rose 1991: 691) are regular but hardly without tension (Covaleski, 
Dirsmith, Heian, & Samuel 1998; Langley 2007). As technologies of the soul, accounting practices 
compound the maintenance of accounts with a tacit coordination of hopes, fears and desires, some 
of which will end up being truly ours. In this way, everyday life and professional accounting seamlessly 
bleed into each other. The time that is lived is put on a timesheet, but it is also subject to timetables 
that discipline our daily schedules (Macintosh 2002: 84-86); our bodies facilitate and get in the way of 
both our private and professional accounts of ourselves (Haynes 2008); and our performance 
appraisals run into us, sometimes deeply. 
Accounting as organisational and professional practice therefore not only shares several general 
characteristics with everyday life accounting – the “et cetera norm” in the application of rules and 
standards, the ramshackle character of making sense of accounts as they are prepared and presented, 
the unease associated with probing them – but also a common point of passage: the human 
practitioner. It is at this point that the passing of accounts once again becomes a passing of people, 
identities and performances, and that accounts attract a variety of functional attributions. It is here 
that the keeping and circulation of records becomes a means of management, government, 
production, and control, and that bookkeeping, statistics, financial and management accounting, 
benchmarking, and so on, bleed into each other. The Foucauldian perspective thus perhaps above all 
reminds us that, as accounts become media for ourselves, our selves also become media of accounts.5 
However, as accounts run by, run into, and pass through partners, managers, co-workers, timesheets, 
folders, meetings, accounting systems, discourses, markets, or governments, tacit coordination 
creates communion among heterogenous constituent in ways that must seem opaque, if not 
somewhat occult. A more sustained analytical effort is required to articulate them. 
Articulating tacit coordination 
To explore what kind of effort is called for, tacit coordination in accounting assemblages can 
provisionally be unpacked and re-articulated in the somewhat more systematic terms of structure, 
agency, and process. This articulation is systematic to the extent of placing tacit coordination in 
contexts with recurrent general characteristics: When you fill out your timesheet, you will have to take 
 
5 Media in the sense of generating communion, a “togetherness of something with something in something” 
(Sloterdijk 2011: 542): We are in the accounts, and the accounts are in us. See also de Certeau 1984: 131-153. 
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into account others (agency) who will successively consider (process) from their particular position 
and angle (structure). The relevant context of tacit coordination with other readers, producers, 
claimants, and interrogators of a timesheet, financial statement or performance card is never entirely 
accidental, but we have already seen that it would not speak for itself: what accounting rules and 
standards there are will always require our interpretation and judgement; the context of an account, 
a profit, loss, excuse, or accusation is never just there to be read off the wall, in an audit report, or 
one people’s faces. At the same time, we rely on our incomplete perceptions and intuitions of these 
contexts and conditions of accounting enough to let each other’s accounts pass as we sign off that 
timesheet or audit report and proceed to discuss office presence on Fridays or buy that pension plan. 
In doing so, we rely on the orderly and regular character of the social world around us in ways that 
merit systematic articulation. 
The main point of doing this here in the arguably tired terms of structure, agency and process is to 
demonstrate that a more systematic investigation of tacit coordination is within close range of well-
established notions of social enquiry – notions which refuse to retire from theoretical discourse 
despite repeated claims by social theorists to have eclipsed them.6 The following considerations will 
indicate a need to gradually re-align these notions when reaching out toward a more systematic 
articulation of tacit coordination: Structure becomes first and foremost a matter of orientation and 
direction; the identification of agency uncovers issues of typification and misapprehension; and 
tracing tacit coordination as a process highlights the sinking of information into accounting 
assemblages. It is in relation to the latter two aspects, matters of agency and process, that limits of 
current accounting theory become more evident. But, in many ways, the building blocks for a more 
systematic analysis of tacit coordination in the passing of accounts and, thus, for a broader theoretical 
articulation of accounting already exist. The broader case for accounting theory made here is not a 
case for starting over from scratch. It is, in many ways, a case for strengthening and focussing existing 
efforts in theoretical articulation. 
 
6 The notion of structure is perhaps the most obvious instance of this. As a concept of social theory, “structure” 
has suffered various degrees of abuse, including by some of the analysts mentioned above and below. Invariably, 
the concept seems to come out clean enough to be abused by the next analyst in line and on mostly similar 
terms (such as ideology, conservatism, functionalism, or, indeed, structuralism). At times, analysts have pitted 
the concepts against each other: structure vs. agency, process vs. everything else, and everything else vs. 
structure. Leveraging such tensions can ill afford to relinquish its reference points, and structures (as well as all 
things structural) have time and again proven to be the most reliable adversaries.  
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Structures: matters of orientation and direction 
The wide-spread use in accounting research of concepts developed by actor-network theorists Callon 
(1986) and Latour (1987) draws attention to the dense textures of relational structure in which 
accounting take place (e.g., P. Miller & Rose 1990: 9-10). The last section has already indicated how 
Foucauldian research highlights structural aspects of tacit coordination that connect the inner worlds 
of accounting practitioners to their social surroundings. These insights can be extended and 
elaborated in structural terms within the wider context of structurally-minded social research, from 
the more conventional territory of social network analysis to recent advances in the theory of social 
fields. 
One benefit of the concepts of social network analysis is that they can foster analyses of network 
patterns also in those cases in which these patterns are difficult to ascertain ‘qualitatively’ by 
describing one tie after the other. The complexity of networks can weigh heavily on the analytical 
narrative; in networks that tie together a large number of positions among, say, managers and 
accountants, centrality cannot be as readily identified as in the case of the Panopticon, and analysts 
will often need to reconstruct network structures from numerous independent observations of 
connectedness. This is relatively easy in cases in which hierarchies are clear and overlap with informal 
accountabilities, but it is much more difficult in cases of laterally sprawling network structures such as 
those associated with the diffusion of information technology, the extension of complex supply chains, 
or the new regimes of “platform organisation” (see Brivot & Gendron 2011: 148-152; Kornberger, 
Pflueger, & Mouritsen 2017). 
In such cases, analysts will often need to use network measures to find less obviously central positions 
that accounting practitioners orient to in the passing of accounts. Different centrality measures allow 
exploring respective patterns in relational data in a nuanced manner (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 169-
202; McCullough, Armstrong, & Johnson 2013: 29-53). If the analyst is interested in repeated patterns 
of relationships (e.g., by tracing lateral flows of information) measures of structural equivalence allow 
identifying nodes and positions that are similar in how they are connected within a network (Lorraine 
& White 1971); lacking an architectural layout that would put particular types of actor (inmates, 
workers, managers) in distinct cells, such structural equivalence is often hard to uncover (Wasserman 
& Faust 1994: 366-375). Likewise, job descriptions – cost accountant, payroll supervisor, fund 
accountant, collections manager – articulate certain forms of structural equivalence, but they only 
give a rough, if not stereotypical, indication of the actual relational landscape in which accounting 
practitioners find themselves. The idea that the formation of identities is coordinated across positions 
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in social networks has been articulated in general network theoretical terms (White 2008) as well as 
in accounting research in terms of accountability relationships (Roberts 1991), but the associated 
dynamics of coordination cannot always be read off from identities that are being presented with a 
view to being passed (see below, section on agencies). Network measures can support respective 
probing and help to tease out relationship dynamics beyond blatant domination. The most prominent 
example of this is perhaps the identification of positions with heightened coordinating potential next 
to “structural holes” (Burt 1992: 18-49). Such positions broker between network clusters and sit where 
accounts will need to pass if they shall travel across. By virtue of being marginal, these positions lack 
the constraints of positions located deeper inside of a cluster. They thus afford unique opportunities 
of influence, for example, across departments of an organisation or across different constituencies of 
a standard-setting assemblage (Richardson 2009: 584). 
The observation that coordination will be both constrained and enabled by social relationships, 
however, barely begins to illuminate the process of coordination across network positions. Despite 
the poignancy of Foucault’s analysis of asymmetric visibility and its impact on scholarship across 
disciplines, the directional character of ties associated with accountability relationships has attracted 
relatively little attention (Gatt 2013). This is regrettable also because once ties can be likened to 
vectors (e.g., when giving an account to somebody and receiving nothing in return) the analysis of 
network blends into the investigation of social fields, the other major structure-facing approach in 
relational sociology (Martin 2003, 2011; Fligstein & McAdam 2011, 2012). This approach builds on the 
works of Bourdieu (1969, 1975) and investigates fields as distributions of vectors, the pull of which 
provides social space with a generic form of gravity (Martin 2003: 6-7, 2011: 271-272). The pull of 
gravity within a field can be observed in many ways, for example by attending to the distribution of 
visual attention that would endow the tower of the Panopticon with weight, the order in which phone 
calls would be made on a Friday afternoon, or the order in which working papers would be reviewed 
and revised. 
Fields are sometimes viewed as general concepts for exploring the “tacit dimension of social life” 
(Reed 2011: 107), which emphasises the pervasive impact of their gravity on how people coordinated 
across position. Bourdieu introduced the term to make sense of the observation that certain positions 
of strength result not from hierarchy but rather from struggles for recognition, for example among 
intellectuals (Bourdieu 1969) or scientists (Bourdieu 1975). Field theory thus provides a canvass for 
exploring how tacit coordination is associated with an orientation towards positions that would 
appear, in terms of vectors pointing their way, to be of high significance. This adds to the investigation 
of relationships and positions in networks an understanding of the direction of attention, influence 
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and convergence, for example in relation to standard-setting (where are the precedents?), 
stakeholder engagement (who do we turn to?), or auditing (where do we look for clarification?) – thus 
connecting the appreciation of structural position more closely with the onset of coordination across 
positions and the problems of orientation endemic to it. Within the rich stream of Bourdieusian 
research in accounting (e.g., Malsch, Gendron, & Grazzini 2011; S. Killian & O’Regan 2016) respective 
structural dynamics have, for example, been investigated in relation to the definition of acceptable 
accounting practice in the field of tax (Gracia & Oats 2012) or the creation of audit spaces (Andon, 
Free, & Sivabalan 2014). 
John Levi Martin’s recent attempt to develop, on the basis of field theory, a novel form of “social 
aesthetics” (Martin 2011: 191-238; Martin & Merriman 2016) may be particularly interesting for 
mapping out further how we respond to, produce, and prepare to pass accounts under the impression 
of a structured social environment. It promises to extend our understanding of accounting and 
accountability by untying it from the primacy of vision and visibility associated with the 
grammatocentrism of contemporary accounting (Bento da Silva, Llewellyn, & Anderson-Gough 2017). 
According to Martin (2011: 307 – italics mine) “one of the central claims of field theory, on which all 
else rests” is that “persons feel the imperatives of action associated with any situation.” The 
implication is that feeling, intuition and taste may be much better metaphors for social cognition and 
judgement than vision and visibility (Martin 2011: 218-219, 231). Discussing accountability in terms of 
taste may give a stronger sense of the unity of judgement, perception, attraction, and action that goes 
into producing, using and responding to accounts (Martin & Desmond 2010). It may also give a much 
clearer sense of how the spontaneous like or dislike of an account, much like the perception of ‘vulgar’ 
art (see Bourdieu 1984), is strongly correlated with field position: Having signed off many timesheets, 
you may come to dread how your colleagues copy and paste their hours from one week to the next, 
you may run quickly over the sheet toward the end of the week, and what you find will perhaps feel 
bitter. 
An aesthetic investigation of accounting in this sense would examine how field position translates into 
taste in accounts. The structure of fields associates the production, circulation, use or challenging of 
accounts with the “socially informed body” (Bourdieu 1977: 124) of the practitioner in the field. If this 
practitioner, say an auditor, has “to be able to feel, almost physically, where a mistake is likely to 
occur, and where, by contrast, there is almost no risk” (Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, & Paillé 2014: 278) 
she may find herself appreciated, perhaps just temporarily, as a “regular audit machine” (Pentland 
1993: 614). The actual substance of her job and her particular taste in accounts, however, will never 
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be defined by a technical or professionally trained script but by the relative strength of forces pulling 
at her position in a field of standards, bosses, clients, friends, partners, and job markets.  
The combination of Foucauldian and actor-network theory which has been so prominent in social and 
critical accounting research since the 1990’s has produced invaluable insights into the connections 
among those managers, rent-seekers, politicians, professionals, consumers, stakeholders and so on, 
who make accounting happen. It has disaggregated the Foucauldian narrative of panopticism with its 
implied assumptions of central oversight into analyses of much less regular, ramshackle accounting 
assemblages (P. Miller & O’Leary 1996; Kornberger, Pflueger, & Mouritsen 2017). This has proven 
instructive in characterising the structured social spaces which involve accounting practitioners and 
artefacts in the coordination of activities, perceptions and understandings (C. Cooper & Joyce 2013; 
Lupu & Empson 2015). Theorising structural components of tacit coordination in terms of positions in 
networks and fields can build on this stream of research just as much as on the variety of Bourdieusian 
efforts in accounting research and in organisation studies (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008). Compiling 
insights on structure raises the odds of identifying structural correlates of tacit coordination beyond 
the paradigm cases of surveillance and discipline, for example, in the interaction with clients and 
colleagues during an audit process, or in navigating the complex networks of accounting regulation 
(e.g., Richardson 2006; Rowbottom & Locke 2016).  
The relational structures of accounting assemblages provide orientation and sense of direction for 
accounting practitioners. Finding these bearings will often mean following the trajectory of accounts 
to where they will need to pass, collecting intelligence on how passing happens (or does not happen), 
and making adjustments to accounts accordingly: filling in a timesheet with a view to who will sign it 
off, resubmitting a revised paper into peer review, making a judgment call in revenue recognition 
whilst feeling the pressure of clients, peers, and regulators. Realising the structured setting of tacit 
coordination is a matter of identifying the passages for accounts, of noting the directions in which they 
are being pushed or pulled, and of treating this as evidence of a distinct distribution of forces, a gravity 
genuine to the assemblage that will reign in accounts, hold them up, and carry them along.  
Actors and agencies: typification and its discontents 
Everyday and professional forms of tacit coordination are rife with vernacular forms of respective 
intelligence gathering. Such intelligence gathering can be frantic and tends to be affected by the 
aesthetics of field position, providing for a taste in accounts as much as for a taste in fellow 
accountants. Information that people seek with priority such as to gain “effective cooperation in 
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maintaining expectations” (Goffman 1983: 5) is often about who it is they are coordinating with. This 
tends to be compounded with implicit structural judgements relating to positions and trajectories 
within an accounting assemblage. Yet, it attracts a form of attention that refuses to be resolved into 
matters of social space: people really want to know who it is they are dealing with. Classifying agency 
according to types (good colleague, reliable pair of hands, audit machine) helps us to anticipate and 
select expectations and actions (Schutz 1962: 15-27; J. Turner 2002: 208-212); it simplifies the 
coordination problems we face when getting in touch with one another in an “ecological huddle” of 
co-presence (Goffman 1963a: 18, 95; Preda 2009: 679-681); it influences greatly how we ready 
ourselves for the passing of accounts.  
As a result, accounting assemblages tend to be rife with categorisations of actors into distinct types. 
Observers are sometimes drawn towards re-using these type categorisations even if many of them 
are based on stereotypes such those of “bloodless” accountants or “disembodied” auditors (Guénin-
Paracini, Malsch, & Paillé 2014: 284-286; Haynes 2008). There is a particular tendency to follow the 
attribution of human agency to actors that are not themselves human but seem so clearly invested 
with human interests: CV’s that express somebody’s career ambitions, timesheets that express 
somebody’s lack of trust. Agency in accounting assemblages is never easily pinned down as either 
human, non-human, or anything in between (Latour 1993). It is hard to imagine a rigorous argument 
in relation to tacit coordination that being an actor would be a more certain status for humans (or 
other biological ‘life-forms’) than it would be for algorithms, ‘inanimate’ objects, or aggregated 
“hyperobjects” (Morton 2013). In professional practice, accountants tacitly coordinate with numerous 
entities without ever getting worried about whether these agents are in fact ‘proper’ actors, for 
example, with accounting standards (not to mention, with their spirits or intentions), impairment 
losses, expected earnings, court cases, timesheets, or the government. When I am putting my hours 
on the record I am literally running the account of my week first by the timesheet – its categories, 
instructions, rows and columns – and only then by my line manager. I may even pause to consider 
what my week looks like on the sheet – or, perhaps, should we say, to the sheet (Prior 2008)? 
In complex accounting assemblages, tacit coordination in the passing of accounts takes place among 
heterogeneous sets of entities. As we receive and fill out timesheets, put deadlines into our calendars 
and file away invoices and appraisal forms, tacit coordination with other people blends into 
coordinating with accounts, much like coordinating with people in the passing of accounts blends into 
coordinating with accounts in the passing of people. The resulting communions of mixed human-non-
human coordination overall appear to produce rather stable accounting practices and outcomes, but 
they can also misbehave: the dramatic swings of valuations associated with the diffusion of bidding 
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and trading algorithms across financial markets and trading platforms is a notorious example (Pardo-
Guerra, Beunza, Millo, & MacKenzie 2010; Roberts & Jones 2009: 862-865). Where non-humans do 
significant work, the use of diminutive type categorisations – just a formula, a spreadsheet, a ‘macro’ 
– not only simplifies coordinating with non-human agency but also seems to blend non-human agency 
into the assemblage without further adjustments (Coombs 2016). Drastic instances of a converse 
blending of agency in favour of “artificial agents” can be found in management accounting systems, 
for example, in the Taylorist co-optation of human effort in industrial production (e.g., Bhimani 1994: 
658-667). The alignment of plants and animals into farming and the management of livestock 
performs a similar rounding off of agency, and one that is increasingly counter-accounted for (Vinnari 
& Laine 2017). 
It is a sociological truism that the very constitution of agency cannot be separated from attributions 
and classifications with respect to what makes up a ‘proper’ actor (see C. Mills 1940; Bromley & 
Sharkey 2017). The use of type categorisations across all walks of personal and professional life may 
indicate that the agency which is thus attributed is good enough to coordinate with, even if it seems 
to be in constant need of management, updating and correction (see Goffman 1963b: 41-104), and 
mostly gives non-humans short shrift. Among humans, one benefit of well-established type 
categorisations is that they make possible a signalling of types which helps to bring about and maintain 
specialised forms of engagement and coordination (Gambetta 2009). The cost for anybody thus 
typified as a good or bad colleague, friend or “audit machine” is the need to consider almost every 
account as a potential type signals – from financial statements and research papers to twitter posts. 
Signalling dynamics have been observed in a multitude of species other than humans (e.g., Milinski, 
Griffiths, Reusch, & Boehm 2010); the underlying mechanisms are not physically or physiologically 
demanding or, for that matter, difficult to formalise (see Gambetta 2009b; Zahavi & Zahavi 1997); 
‘artificial’ agents (such as those who will consider your credit card application) are making wide use of 
them.  
Making type attributions helps to stabilise tacit coordination by reducing the spectrum of possible 
responses and by closing the circle of participants, but it also provides an occasion for error and 
exploitive uses of type signals within this circle (Goffman 1963b: 73-91, 1974: 83-123). The latter takes 
advantage of the fact that type categorisations simultaneously articulate and paper over 
heterogeneity among actors. The partial and schematic articulation of this heterogeneity will tend to 
remain unchallenged as long as tacit coordination proceeds. One of game theory’s more notorious 
coordination game narratives, the “battle of the sexes” scenario, expresses this insight in the image 
of a couple, one of whom will end up having to pretend a false type in perpetuating an initial dating 
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arrangement, for example, by ostensibly enjoying the opera for years to come. In professional settings 
of accounting practice, standard-setters’ infatuation with assuming a particular nature of ‘the’ user 
may well express a similar kind of disconnect (J. Young 2006; Adhikari & Gårseth-Nesbakk 2016: 136); 
in relation to management accounting, the Taylorist construction of the worker as a cog in the machine 
and the reconstruction of animals as livestock again come to mind. 
As tacit coordination funnels heterogeneous forms of agency into a finite number of types (“enjoys 
opera”, “maximises utility”, “makes the piece-rate”, “makes a good roast”), this poses, in the passing 
of accounts, a problem of recognition and potential misapprehension of participants such as in the 
figure of the “regular audit machine” (Pentland 1993: 614). There are instances, for example, in which 
the convenient figure of the ‘user’ fails to orient the enactment of accountability altogether, most 
notably in instances of social and environmental reporting (e.g., Rinaldi, Unerman, & Tilt 2014). Once 
the symbolic service to ‘the’ shareholder cannot bring about the discharge of accountability that is 
being desired, it becomes notoriously difficult to recruit a finite number of breathing bodies to co-opt 
into the passing of accounts (see Greenwood & Kamoche 2012). However, this does not mean that 
these stakeholders would not exist or might not be delighted to take advantage of opportunities to 
prod accountants, perhaps even towards offering accounts which could be more comprehensively 
‘useful’ (e.g., Atkins, Atkins, Thomson, & Maroun 2015; Benneworth & Jongbloed 2010). Likewise, the 
fact that it is difficult for government to find actual “armchair auditors” in the general population 
(Bracci, Humphrey, Moll, & Steccolini 2015: 886) does not mean that this population would generally 
not care about how taxes are spent; the construction of workers by Taylorist engineers, cost 
accountants, or for that matter, by trade unionists may or may not be congenial to them; the pursuit 
of animal welfare in the slaughter of farm animals may just be the most extreme example of how the 
most well-meaning attempts to acknowledge others beyond their existence as a type (e.g., Terlouw 
et al. 2008) can still fail to get them out of the dead end their type provides them with. 
A fully developed theoretical awareness of tacit coordination in the passing of accounts will therefore 
require an understanding of agency that is broader than the typified understanding of agency which 
can be found within an accounting assemblage (e.g., Christensen & Demski 2002; American 
Accounting Association 1966). Being in accounts and being party to their passing is not limited to 
humans, and the image of the autonomous human individual as the prototypical thinker and doer may 
not at all be a good starting point for understanding the resulting forms of exposure. As far as human 
beings are concerned, typification often appears as “typecasting” (Conor 2015): The agency that 
passes as such, whether among the authors and readers of annual reports (J. Young 2006; Bromley & 
Sharkey 2017) or within audit teams (Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, & Paillé 2014: 284-286), may often be 
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but a mere shadow of the agency that is active in the process of making accounting happen. We seem 
to recognise these differences more easily once they apply to humans, but they exist also for all the 
others who are tied into the passing of accounts: the many allies in our accounting assemblages who 
silently pass on the numbers, work overnight, calculate ratios, make their bids, or lay their eggs – until 
they stop? 
Processes: information sinks 
A more comprehensive and granular understanding of tacit coordination in the passing of accounts 
will proceed from identifying structures and actors as reference points to tracing coordination at the 
level of the social process. As with matters of structure and agency, scholars have been using a variety 
of concepts in articulating process aspects of tacit coordination. Much of what is going on in tacit 
coordination as a process has been classified under the broad category of interdependent learning. 
One instance of this is the growing literature on situated learning and distributed cognition (e.g., Contu 
& Willmott 2003; Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon 2005); another is game-theoretical research that has been 
making headway in analytical philosophy and economics (e.g., Skyrms 1996; H. P. Young 1998). 
Despite a history of inter-disciplinary trench warfare between economists and social scientists of other 
persuasions, these analyses are in many ways congenial to the micro-sociological insights discussed 
above (Vollmer 2013a). Understanding tacit coordination in terms of learning, however, relies on a 
typification of agency that perhaps puts participants of tacit coordination at its receiving end a little 
too quickly – and in a rather progressive understanding, often with humanist undertones, of what is 
being asked of them: to be a good student and eventually be rewarded. 
Another way of articulating processes of tacit coordination has been to track these processes in 
sequences of framing and productions of contexts. As discussed above, the use of ‘frame’ as a noun 
by Bateson (1987 [1972]), Goffman (1974), Callon (1998) and many others (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 
1984; Bacharach 2006) must not distract from the fact that any frame that is being articulated is a 
mere correlate of an ongoing production of context (Lorino, Mourey, & Schmidt 2017). Making sense 
of activities, perceptions and understandings within any situation always requires further framing – 
and making sense of accounts is no exception. No account could by itself speak for an organisation, a 
business, for you, for me, or ‘for itself’. It is always the surrounding accounting assemblage that makes 
an account speak, as in this space between you and me, with this account going through us just now. 
Speaking of ‘the’ frame across situations generalises from such active productions of context, which 
can be a useful analytical step in exploring differences between such productions (Lorino, Mourey, & 
Schmidt 2017: 45-46). It draws attention to the fact that participants of tacit coordination endow 
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frames and framings with stability, which can make the frames somewhat disposable and 
substitutable, e.g., between repeated readings of the same account (e.g., when using different 
methodologies in analysing a financial statements). 
However, if the freezing of frames into form is combined with an excessive concern to keep frames in 
place, there can at times be a loss of containment – an “overflow” (Callon 1998). Such loss of 
containment can happen with respect to previously unarticulated, marginalised, or subsumed 
information once it becomes too large to ignore, or with respect to people who can no longer keep 
quiet and suddenly “flood out” (Goffman 1974: 350-358). The notion of the overflow shares with the 
more widely used concept of the externality the reference to marginalised pieces of information but 
indicates cases in which such marginalisation can no longer be maintained in a present production of 
context. In the case of an overflow, the tendency of adhering to the “Simon and Garfinkel” principle 
(everything is okay, and there is no need to make things any more difficult) leads to an accommodation 
of potentially discrepant information in a present frame that challenges its present form from within 
(M. Christensen & Skærbæk 2007; Vosselman 2014: 194-195). The overflow results from burdening 
an ongoing production of context with baggage that becomes increasingly difficult to contain: an audit 
team that works just like a set of well-oiled audit machines but has more and more members going on 
sick leave, a strategy of off-balance sheet reporting that suffers from increasing materiality, an “other 
activity” category on the timesheet that grows until it contains most hours of the week. 
The over-containment that precedes the overflow is sometimes said to result from “structural 
secrecy” (Vaughan 1999: 276-277) – networks, groups, or departments that contain information in a 
manner preventing its further circulation. This secrecy may be more appropriately understood as a 
containment and disarticulation of information within an ongoing process rather than within a kind of 
structural container (Martin 2015: 35).7 Process secrecy is often maintained despite a lack of robust 
structural barriers. Any silence inherent in a process of tacit coordination will assume a more structural 
appearance once the situation in which it had been inherent has ended and much of the information 
contained in it is subsequently lost. Somewhat ironically, this issue can be compounded by overflows 
that trigger a lot of accounting in their wake, such as in forensic accounting or the adjustment of 
 
7 Again, the situation between you and me, reader and writer, may provide a good illustration: You may be alone 
while reading this, but I am literally with you – here, now. If I was also sitting here with you, what difference 
would that make if I remained silent, or if we decided not to talk? And if nothing gets out to others from our 
engagement, or back and forth between us, this secrecy (say, about my frustrations writing this or your 
frustrations reading it) will always be more a matter of process – of not involving ourselves accordingly, or of 
not managing to make ourselves sufficiently clear, here and now – than a matter of structure (e.g., of being in 
the same room, field, special interest group, or footnote).  
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standards that follow spectacular corporate collapses. This curious switch from under-accounting and 
over-containment of unarticulated issues towards forensic over-accounting and under-containment 
commits further risk management to keeping track of the problems that are identified in the wake of 
the overflow. Simultaneously, the next overflow is beginning to be incubated where problems remain 
comparatively ill-defined and under-articulated (B. Turner 1976; Vollmer 2013b: 143-145). It appears 
that our accounts must always struggle to catch up with whatever is going on. 
Overflows open windows on the silently active elements of tacit coordination; this was the main 
motivation for Garfinkel (1967: 35-75) to conduct his breaching experiments in the first place. This 
strategy of information retrieval has been called “Garfinkeling” (V. Miller & Jablin 1991: 107), and the 
‘stress testing’ of financial institutions must seem like a rather gentle attempt of prodding accounting 
assemblages (e.g., Power 2009: 852; Richard 2015: 29). Garfinkeling cannot generally overcome the 
process secrecy inherent in tacit coordination, but it demonstrates that, in an important sense, all the 
information is always present, in the process. The “background expectancies” targeted by Garfinkel 
(1967: 36-37) are packed away into the background by routine and habit, but they are active. Such 
habit is itself not closed off from either the world or from us and can perhaps even be considered as 
that mode of existence in which actors and agencies primarily realise themselves (Latour 2013: 265-
278). Structurally minded analyses associate habit with the absorption of information along our 
trajectories through networks and fields (Bourdieu 1990: 52-79; Neu, Everett, Rahaman & Martinez 
2013: 509); more process-oriented analyses associate habit with the very possibility of structure (see 
Abbott 2016: 216; Luhmann 1995: 92-97, 303-307). Reconstructing tacit coordination on the level at 
which habit is operational means reconstructing in a step-by-step manner how the complexity of 
coordination problems is enacted such that “the implicit lacks nothing” (Latour 2013: 274): where we 
know our numbers, where to sign off and where to pause, where accounting standards are complete 
for all intents and purposes, where your timesheet is your week, and we are on the same page. 
A variety of terms have been used to investigate the order inherent in the social process, from 
Garfinkel’s “ethnomethods” (Garfinkel 1974; see J. Turner 1988: 111) to Luhmann’s codification of 
communication (Luhmann 2013: 90-95) and Latour’s modes of existence (Latour 2013). In sociology 
and organisational research, this general sense of “order at all points” (Sacks 1984a: 22) has recently 
assumed a particularly confident articulation in the idea of “institutional logics” (see Thornton, Ocasio, 
& Lounsbury 2012: 2-4). There is no space here to discuss the opportunities and weaknesses of this 
approach in any detail (see Quattrone 2015a), but a risk is apparent of prematurely pronouncing select 
structural or agential correlates of a social process as its governing principles, authors, or even 
creators. Process secrecy points to the fact that there is always more going on than what the collected 
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correlates of tacit coordination would suggest, whether these are structures, actors, agencies, actions, 
audit machines, users, ‘logics’ or other “self-descriptions” (Luhmann 2013: 175-183) that are 
circulating within an assemblage. Whilst these are always incomplete articulations of an ongoing social 
process, this process is always utterly complete in the sense of not lacking anything, making 
redundant, as it were, the entire world, one moment at a time. 
Against this background, theorising tacit coordination as a process needs to bring its ephemeral 
character into relief. If tacit coordination within accounting assemblages can be disaggregated into 
sequences of passes, these are not only passes in the sense of Goffman and Garfinkel but passages in 
the sense of Whitehead (1920: 54-56; see Stengers 2011: 42-57) and Latour (2013: 100-101): passages 
that expose what passes them, from accounts passed on to be signed off or pushed back to the people, 
institutions, technologies, and all the ‘externalities’ tied up with an accounting assemblage. These 
entities pass in accounts as companies, auditors, employees, students, farms and harvests. In this 
sense, the constituents of an accounting assemblage are literally being processed. Whilst all the 
information is there in the process, it is being processed in different ways – some information is sunk 
into personal memory, some is printed on paper, some onto the ground, some into the atmosphere. 
While in its totality, such processing and passing-through would not seem to lose any information, it 
continuously refiles it, making much of it hard to retrieve. In treating these questions of process – how 
information is sunk, where it is sunk, how deeply it is buried and whether it will make a difference – 
as a question of procedure, accounting practitioners from scribes and bookkeepers to auditors and 
analysts of ‘big data’, have been defining their expertise in relation to a practical problem that must 
seem universal to any collective that tries to keep track of itself: holding on to the information – or, 
shall we say, the existence? – that it processes and which may otherwise sink beyond reach. 
As a process, tacit coordination thus sinks information into various depths, with only some of that 
information preserved in the explicitness of accounts that are being processed for later retrieval. 
Perhaps you would even like to see that Friday afternoon committed to your fond personal memories 
only, rather than having to put it on a timesheet. If you must put it on the sheet, perhaps you would 
want to sink your information ‘safely’, such that you know what different people will ‘get’ from that 
sheet. You may even want to present the timesheet to your partner who is asking you “such silly 
questions”. In any case, that Friday afternoon would have been processed and sunk as information 
always at least once already (into you), with only some of it to be retrieved and reprocessed on further 
demand (from your memory onto that sheet, and onwards from the sheet onto somebody else’s gaze, 
mouth, or memory). The passing of accounts allows us to move on, perhaps with some confidence 
that what has been sunk will not haunt us – or others – as we carry on with it (McSweeney 2000). The 
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relative benefits and opportunities associated with any such passing tend to be distributed unevenly: 
some information will become easily retrievable, other information will require some digging, and the 
odds of recovering either will vary, depending on the skill, access, and taste of different diggers. 
As we have seen above, the audit is a good example of how differences in accessibility to information 
sunk into various depths (in audited statements, working papers, or auditors) are brought about and 
maintained in a regular manner. The respective complicity of accounting practitioners has been 
denounced as the whitewashing of companies, as history written by the victors, or as service to the 
domination of labour by capital. Accounting scholarship should be cautious about turning against 
accounting practice on such relatively crude terms whilst still struggling to fully appreciate its 
predicament: being asked to stem the tide of a social process that always files away more information 
than accounting practitioners would be able to hold up. 
The stewardship of silence 
The accounting profession and its regulators overall seem well prepared, if not entirely keen, to 
respond to revelations in the wake of overflows (Clikeman 2013), and this includes overcoming 
silences which are recognised retrospectively (Sikka 2009). These silences become apparent once 
previously sunk information resurfaces as something that was missed or deliberately passed over 
when a decision was made, a financial statement published, or a timesheet filled out. Accounting 
professionals, along with all other accounting practitioners, are stewards of these silences by virtue of 
their involvement in the passing of accounts. They often find responses to overflows below the radar 
of public discourse by quietly accommodating accounts. Such backstage forms of risk management 
are virtues within the stewardship of silence to the extent in which they help prevent unwelcome 
surprises. However, such expertise in quiet accommodation may need to be acknowledged more 
openly for accounting professionals to retain this stewardship in the long run against, among other 
things, the perception of being technical specialists who are too much in bed with their clients. Such 
perceptions are but one form in which the separation of the technical from the social, and the explicit 
from the tacit, comes back to haunt the accountant. If the stewardship of silence remains 
unacknowledged, it is prone to become a scandal once it has become apparent. 
So how instead to speak with confidence of accounting’s role in its messy social settings? Accounting 
scholarship has tended to maintain a focus on what exactly accounting makes explicit, even when 
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contextualising it rather broadly in its settings. The insight that accounting is not reflective but to some 
extent constitutive of reality – a widely shared gospel in critical and interdisciplinary accounting 
scholarship (Morgan 1988; Hines 1988) – is a particularly striking instance of this. How exactly that 
constitutive role is delineated and how it relates to the fact that accountants are not the sole authors 
of such reality have certainly remained contentious issues (Macintosh et al. 2000; Mattesich 2003). 
But if accounting and accountants do not command the declarative power of strong “Austinian 
performativity” (MacKenzie 2004: 305; Vosselman 2014), it is unclear how exactly accounting would 
bring about reality by spelling some of it out. Accounting numbers and concepts travel across 
accounting assemblages in which heterogeneous actors come together to make sense of them. 
Making inferences about whether and how accounts relate to, reflect, or constitute, realities is but 
one outcome of these processes. Accounting professionals do not provide users of accounting 
information with realities but provide them with material, or ammunition, to complement and 
augment such realities (see Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes, & Nahapiet 1980: 14-17; Bay 2018). 
These realities are always already lived alongside the ongoing passing of accounts of them. No 
timesheet would construct in any way a reality in which activities fall neatly into boxes, nor would 
people’s filing of timesheets indicate their belief in such a reality. Likewise, to claim that timesheets 
(or financial statements, performance appraisals, or productivity measures) would “communicate” 
such a reality, would seem rather odd. If these qualifications, as one of the reviewers of this paper 
pointed out, are still very much in the “spirit” of Hines’ (1988) widely cited paper, they cannot but 
deny its title: We do not construct reality by communicating it – we do not communicate reality to 
begin with. No account must be confused with people’s beliefs about the world, or with the world 
itself (Latour 2013: 437). 
Perhaps making inferences about an underlying reality on the basis of accounting signs has become a 
less important role of accounting altogether (Macintosh et al. 2000), but this has to be a matter of 
degree: We may have other bases, categories and terms of reality to lean on and still light-heartedly 
accept accountants’ constructs without objection, proceeding to shrug them off or, perhaps, later on, 
dig them up for closer scrutiny. The passing of accounts will coordinate activities by commanding 
attention gradually in a world full of signs and signals. There can be little doubt that at this point the 
“accounting profession enjoys substantial authority in identifying, valuing and recording events and 
circumstances in money terms” (Carnegie & West 2005: 907). However, if such authority is 
determined mainly by professionals’ enduring ability to strike a key with actors who draw on their 
own intuitions in responding to accounts and accountabilities, any such authority will be subject to an 
economy of attention that cannot but appear volatile (Vollmer 2016) and, if recent challenges to 
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scientific authority in the name of “alternative facts” are any indication (Nealon 2017: 19),8 open to 
competing forms of orchestration. 
Accounting’s constitutive role, to the extent that it ever existed, may be described more appropriately 
in terms of providing “keys” in the sense of Goffman and Schelling (see above), or perhaps of 
“keynotes” (R. Turner & L.M. Killian 1972: 47) that would “enhance the probability of congruent action 
occurring” (Ezzamel 2009: 377). The stewardship of silence creates a space for accounts to be heard 
and to find listeners, as suggested by the original meaning of the word ‘audit’. It is a stewardship of 
passing that allows accounts to travel across an assemblage. In this respect, accountants have always 
been in an intermediary position between human and non-human actors, between people and their 
records, scriptures, farms, soils and territories, exercising stewardship of the continuous sinking of 
information. In accounting theory, this intermediary position seems to have mainly suggested a role 
for accountants in facilitating monitoring or control (e.g., Watts & J.L. Zimmerman 1986: 196-221; R. 
Bryer 1993: 671-673) rather than, say, the education of managers (Hopwood 1976: 115-116), or the 
preservation of information in relation to the broader ecology of an accounting assemblage (see 
Dermer 1990; Corvellec, Ek, Zapata, & Zapata Campos 2016). To fully appreciate accounting’s 
stewardship position requires an understanding that any information presented in an account sits on 
top of a mountain of information sunk into silence. Friendly suggestions – those flattering the status 
of the accounting professional – that the account at the top will be a cleaned-up version of everything 
that sits below resonate well with separations of the technical from the social. Like these separations, 
what seems to elevate the position of a select group of accounting practitioners in the short term may 
undermine it in the long term.  
The effective institutionalisation of accounting and its professional jurisdiction has varied across 
countries and it has not led to a generally recognised claim of being the information profession (see 
Abbott 1988: 216-46). Whilst accounting professionals continue to occupy intermediary positions 
between humans and information systems, they are increasingly facing accounts constructed by 
experts, accounting practitioners in their own ways, from other backgrounds. The immense 
proliferation of information systems, calculation and valuation devices threatens to make many of the 
more routine aspects of accounting redundant. There is competition from a new generation of data 
experts and information analysts who offer expertise in modelling, simulation and visualisation to 
stakeholders (e.g., O’Dwyer 2011; Davies 2017: 240-244). If activity within accounting assemblages is 
increasingly coordinated by outputs from information technology and visualisations of information 
 
8 One of the reviewers helpfully pointed this out. 
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that is sourced from ‘big data’ with less and less assistance from intermediary human practitioners, 
the traditional territory of accounting professionals may be slipping away from them. Closing off 
against such intrusion the remainder of the professional jurisdiction of accountancy by the traditional 
means of certification and accreditation will only delay the process of attrition if accountants continue 
to be trained for work that is less and less a matter of human labour. The “rise of the robots” (Ford 
2015) challenges accountants as much as other professionals (Susskind & Susskind 2015; Guthrie & 
Parker 2016: 4), but the simultaneous rise of information systems also indicates that there are forms 
of human expertise (e.g., in software engineering and customisation) that stand to benefit from 
technological change at the expense of accountants. If accountants want to keep their intermediary 
positions between human beings and information systems, they will need to respond to such 
competing claims of expertise more pro-actively. 
Appreciating accountants’ role in tacit coordination as “diplomatic” rather than “cyborg 
intermediaries” (Davies 2017: 240-244) implies knowledge of some depth about how people interact 
with and respond to accounts. To moderate this relationship could be considered what accountants 
have been doing all along (Quattrone 2015a, 2015b). Accountants have always inhabited “workplaces 
that combine sophisticated machines and humans in partnership of mutual augmentation” 
(Davenport & Kirby 2016: 228); they are generally in good positions to complement, compete or strike 
alliances with novel forms of information expertise that have been emerging in accounting 
assemblages. But a determined defence of the kind of stewardship that accounting professionals can 
offer against this background has been lacking. Accounting scholarship can contribute to this defence 
by pushing back, above all, against the re-imagination of accountancy in terms of technicalities 
(Hopwood 1976: 13-14, 202). Accounting scholars as much as accounting professionals will do well to 
listen closely to what their competitors such as engineers, computer or data scientists are offering. If 
seasoned accounting practitioners are perhaps more aware than other information professionals of 
the process secrecies accompanying any stream of information, they need to compete with confident 
claims in the information service marketplace that clients could be provided with immediate access 
to the data they desire. In the desire for more, ever cleaner or ‘bigger’ data, accountants are 
confronting what Latour (2013: 93-95, 135-140) has described as the temptations of the “double 
click”: the seductive idea that accounts could, and that they should, provide ‘just the facts’ or ‘just the 
numbers’ (Sorter 1969; Lieberman & Whinston 1975).  They will therefore need to take a clear stance 
against the suggestion that any account could present that “double click” access to what there is to 
know – which is nothing but an outright denial that there would have to be any stewardship of silence 
to begin with. 
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If accounting were to cleanse itself from the social entanglement that has been part and parcel to this 
stewardship, it would in the same sweep wipe out its unique position in the competition of 
information professionals. The sinking of information in the passing of accounts presents an ethical 
challenge that is inevitable, tied to the very existence of accounting expertise. This challenge exists 
not just in terms of the information that remains sunk and unarticulated but also in terms of the 
heterogeneity of interests that the passing of accounts tends to gloss over. Since tacit coordination 
neither brings about nor requires a generally shared consensus about the outcomes that are being 
accomplished, participants often coordinate towards truces which they prefer not to upset even if 
they privately feel short-changed by them. Game theory’s “battle of the sexes” remains perhaps the 
clearest demonstration of the potentially quite uneven welfare outcomes of tacit coordination 
(Vollmer 2013a: 386-388). If the stewardship of accounts and accountabilities is always a stewardship 
of silence, this stewardship needs to be associated with ethics of professional practice that address 
both the material risks of passing accounts and the often-uneven distribution of risks that is associated 
with such passing (Tinker 1991; Roslender, Marks, & Stevenson 2015). Embracing the stewardship of 
silence will end up being complicit to acts of silencing if it does not also provide passages to 
interrogating the “effective cooperation in maintaining expectations” (Goffman 1983: 5) which 
unevenly distributes the costs and benefits of its accomplishment. Conversely, it may at times be an 
ethical choice to maintain silences about activities that are not accounted for (Messner 2009; 
Roslender, Marks, & Stevenson 2015). The stewardship of silence has to accept responsibility for any 
such silence, whether this silence, once broken, would be seen as a virtue, an unavoidable risk, or a 
scandal. Accountants who exercise such stewardship need to find ethically defensible ways of letting 
things slide because they eventually must. Against this background, the long-term interests of the 
accounting assemblage must not be confused with the interests of those within the assemblage who 
compensate the accountants. 
The embodiment of the “feel for the game” among accounting practitioners could be considered the 
historical counterweight to the process secrecy and continuous sinking of information characterising 
all accounting – and at the same time, a corrective to the ever-grander illusions of fact gathering. Until 
the books are closed in public, much more information has been passed through and sunk into 
accountants who put these books together and countless other entities tied into accounting 
assemblages, from farm animals to workers, algorithms, and spreadsheets. In relation to the fleeting 
social situations in which information is processed and sunk, participants’ bodies are “vehicles of 
situational immortality” (Katz 1999: 37). This certainly remains true also for the non-human multitudes 
entangled in contemporary accounting assemblages who observe our commuting, spending, reading 
and writing patterns and commit them to diverse forms of memory (Esposito 2017: 259-262). Yet 
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accounting practitioners, professionals and all the others who have learnt to be pleased, disgusted, 
anxious, embarrassed, or just slightly irritated by the passing of accounts, present a distinctive human 
hope for carrying forward information – and one that accounting theory can ill afford to abandon. It 
is the body and the soul, not infrequently ridiculed, of an actual, human accountant that accounting 
theory needs to help out. Accounting theory, in other words, needs to offer genuine life support for 
accounting practitioners who privately shoulder the weight of information that is obscure to its 
professionally consecrated statements and oblivious to accounting standards and textbooks. 
Narrowing down the support of accounting practitioners, particularly those in occupationally 
privileged positions, to what is technically required to ‘just do’ the accounts, in contrast, must appear 
like a genuine recipe for incubating disaster (Lee 2013: 154-156).  
Conclusion: the broader case for accounting theory 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that tacit coordination is a domain of enquiry worthy of 
more systematic attention, supportive of a broader case for accounting theory. The potential scope of 
this domain is wider than the limited sets of examples discussed here: It connects the production of 
accounts and accountabilities in everyday life with the more technical aspects of professional practice 
in a continuum of passes and passages. The professional relevance of accounting theory against the 
background of this wide domain needs to be associated with accountants’ role as intermediaries in 
accounting assemblages that connect human beings with their records and recordings, supply chains, 
territories, companions, souls and soils. Like a middle child manoeuvring between parents and siblings, 
accounting practitioners acquire “social skill” (Fligstein 2001) in holding on to these positions. 
Understanding and augmenting this social skill needs to be at the heart of accounting theory. Ongoing 
socio-technical change challenges accountants’ positions and their ability to offer effective 
stewardship of the passing of accounts, which inevitably turns out to be a stewardship of silence. This 
position may eventually slip away from accounting professionals if they fail to claim and defend the 
skill-set associated with this stewardship in a more assertive manner, or, worse, if they choose to 
reject it outright in favour of supposedly cleaner forms of expertise. 
The structural embeddedness of accountants’ positions in accounting assemblages has received 
considerable attention by scholars investigating the implicit patterns of professional practice. This has 
often been motivated by the salience of recurrent structural forms that provide reference points for 
tacit coordination such as networks and hierarchies, and also by the prominence of metaphors like 
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the Panopticon in accounting discourse. Similarly, the understanding of tacit coordination in terms of 
recurrent types of agency – stakeholders, shareholders, principals, agents, capital, labour – has 
oriented accounting practitioners and accounting scholars alike in relation to how the passing of 
accounts is being accomplished. Accounting theory has tended to utilise and to some extent codify 
these vernacular understandings of structures and agencies, most widely perhaps in borrowing from 
the “reflection theories” of economic practice (Luhmann 2013: 234-236), from mundane business case 
reasoning to sophisticated pricing models. Despite the advantages associated with such conceptual 
piggy-backing – its intuitive appeal and the marketability of respective theorising – it lures our 
understanding of the passing of accounts into assessments that are as superficially correct as they are 
analytically sterile: it’s capitalism, stupid! These vernacular understandings lead into a world of 
‘capitalists’, ‘users’, ‘employer’, ‘workers’, ‘managers’, ‘audit machines’, ‘livestock’, and other entities 
in inverted commas. They distract from developing more involved forms of accounting knowledge by 
presenting themselves as straight talk about what accounting ‘really’ is about (Latour 2013: 126-129; 
Martin 2015: 246-247). These discursive by-products of accounting practice must not be confused 
with the world of which they ramble. Accounting theory needs to be able to mobilise “method theory” 
and “domain theory” (Lukka & Vinnari 2014) in a free-spirited manner, unbound from the narrow 
limits of talking ‘straight’. Ultimately, it will need to be confident enough to offer a “super-theory” 
(Luhmann 1995: 4-5) of accounting: an account of accounting that includes what is conventionally 
regarded as accounting theory as a special type of account; an accounting theory that confidently 
accounts for its own position, its borrowings from the numerous maps of accounting assemblages that 
already exist, for the well-trodden shortcuts across them, and for those obstacles and complications 
to our understanding of accounting that we better not avoid. The road to such theory must lead 
through the issues that are foundational for accounting as a whole and require efforts at articulation 
that will feel onerous for anybody who has learned to understand accounting primarily through its 
vernaculars. That is, for all of us. 
This paper has accordingly made the case for tacit coordination as a crucial reference point and, 
potentially, a key foundational issue for making further progress in accounting theory. What enters as 
accounting theory into textbooks continues to be rather disconnected both from the diversity of 
accounting practice and from the full scope of intelligence offered by contemporary accounting 
scholarship. These disconnects may satisfy purifiers with more narrowly-defined disciplinary 
convictions, but it must be overcome in developing accounting into a fully-fledged social science. If 
Hopwood’s agenda “to develop accounting to be a self-conscious and respectable discipline among 
other social sciences” (Carmona & Lukka 2010: 396) is to prevail despite such difficulties, it will require 
a more confident position of accounting scholarship also in relation to the other disciplines. 
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Sociological theory can help to develop accounting’s knowledge base and so can anthropological or 
psychological theory (Hall 2016). But neither these nor, to mention the perhaps still most serious 
contender, economics can offer a position from which to unilaterally establish the premises of 
accounting theory in its general forms. 
In accounting for tacit coordination, accounting scholarship has been most articulate in matters of 
structure, driven by a wide-ranging receptiveness to sociohistorical research. It has shown a recent 
uptick of interest in matters of agency, due mostly to the influence of actor-network theory, ecological 
discourse, and the behavioural sciences. This has not resulted yet in a fundamental 
reconceptualisation of what it means to be with accounts and, to some extent, in them. In matters of 
process, accounting scholarship would benefit perhaps most dramatically from reaching out still more 
broadly towards interdisciplinary engagement – not only with the social and behavioural sciences, but 
also with the wilder reaches of philosophy, epistemology, and ontology. Further progress on any of 
these matters, however, will be limited if the domain of accounting remains a mere target of 
application, with “the battle for accounting theory” (Hoskin 1994) fought in the name of ulterior 
intellectual motives. Accounting theory needs to take on board allies perhaps more widely than ever 
before to extend its register of method theories (Lukka & Vinnari 2014). At the same time, if it shall 
remain free to do so, it cannot allow itself to be taken over by any of these allies. If accounting 
continues to grow into a discipline with strong theoretical foundations, it will be able to afford more 
rather than less interdisciplinarity. 
The problem of tacit coordination with its chequered history across the social and behavioural 
sciences offers a focal point for drawing together empirical and conceptual intelligence from 
accounting research broadly considered. Accounting theory built on this broader basis promises to 
not only help practitioners keep in touch with the tacit undercurrents of their practice – it also 
promises to make accounting scholarship more relevant to other disciplines, the wider constituency 
of stakeholders of accounting practice and, thus, given the scope and impact of our accounting 
assemblages, the planet. Accounting theory would ideally be a supreme antidote against the idea that 
any account could ever speak for itself – or that it should. The pervasiveness of tacit coordination is a 
constant reminder that, whatever an account will leave us with, upon passing, getting us to get it will 
always be a social accomplishment. Armed with this understanding, the promise of accounting would 
be that of a social science comprehensively concerned with how humans and their fellow beings 
coordinate in putting their existence on record – and how we come to be silent about everything else.
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